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Abstract
Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct
a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis,
namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity
and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from
another participants payo¤. Deterrent incentives vary across and within ses-
sions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis:
except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the
incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selsh subjects who act accord-
ing to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent
incentives backre.
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1 Introduction
That crime has to be punished seems to be universally accepted. The purpose and
level of punishment, however, are controversial. Immanuel Kant advocated punish-
ment to re-establish justice, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel stressed that ill has to
be retaliated with ill. Both philosophers regard punishment as a mean to establish
justice. In contrast, there exist schools of thoughts which stress that punishment
shall prevent (future) crime. Beckers (1968) deterrence hypothesis is the classic
economic contribution to the debate on punishment. According to Becker the pur-
pose of punishment is to (e¢ ciently) deter individuals from committing crimes. To
achieve deterrence Becker relies on the power of pure deterrent incentives such as
the severity and probability of punishment. The deterrence hypothesis states that
crime rates fall in the severity and in the probability of punishment.
Our laboratory experiment tests the deterrence hypothesis in a controlled en-
vironment that permits to exogenously vary deterrent incentives, i.e. detection
probability and level of punishment. For this purpose we use a very straightforward
context, namely subjects have the possibility to steal from another subjects payo¤.
In this setup they cannot only decide whether they steal or not, but also how much
they steal. We ask a very basic but important question: do deterrent incentives
work?
In order to answer this question we have chosen one of the simplest possible
designs: a modied dictator game. Two agents, A and B, are randomly matched.
Agent A is a passive agent and has a higher initial endowment than agent B. Agent
B can decide how much to take away (steal) from As initial endowment. With
probability 1   p, this amount is transferred from A to B. With probability p
("detection probability"), however, this amount is not transferred and a xed ne f
is deducted from Bs initial endowment if B has chosen a strictly positive amount.
We conduct six di¤erent treatments in which we vary detection probability p
and ne f . Our benchmark treatment T1 sets p = f = 0. Treatments T2, T3,
and T4 investigate the range of small and intermediate deterrent incentives, i.e.
levels of incentives such that taking agent As whole initial endowment pays o¤ in
expectation. Treatment T5 is characterized by a combination of p and f such that
taking everything generates about the same expected payo¤ as taking nothing. In
treatment T6, however, the expected payo¤ from taking everything is substantially
smaller than the one from taking nothing. Each subject participates in two di¤erent
treatments sequentially. This design permits both an across subjects and a within
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subject analysis of taking behavior. In other words, we can analyze di¤erent regimes
and regime changes with the data at hand.
Our experimental design focuses on the e¤ects of simple and pure incentives
which makes it distinct from previously conducted experiments. First of all, incen-
tives are set exogenously (by the experimenter) and are not endogenously determined
by another subject. Hence, the intensity of incentives does not signal trust, expec-
tations or intentions which could potentially inuence an agents decision. Second,
as one of the two agents is completely passive, any strategic uncertainty is removed
for the active agent. Therefore, the intensity of incentives does not a¤ect the active
agents beliefs about the other agents choice and thereby a¤ecting an agents de-
cision. Third, as the payo¤ table is common knowledge, the intensity of incentives
does not signal costs and benets of certain actions which could potentially drive
an agents decision. Our design has three main advantages. (i) The task is easy
to understand for the subjects. (ii) Our design allows to test the isolated e¤ect of
incentives per se. (iii) It captures some crucial features of a certain class of crimes
like stealing: the victim is rather passive, and it cannot set the severity of punish-
ment and - to a large extent - the detection probability; in case of a theft the stolen
amount is a good predictor of the thiefs benet and the victims costs.
The results obtained in our across subjects analysis clearly reject the deterrence
hypothesis: the average taken amount is not monotonically (weakly) decreasing in
p and f . In contrast, we nd that incentives may backre: on average subjects take
signicantly more in the treatment with intermediate deterrent incentives than in the
absence of incentives. Only very strong incentives deter subjects from taking. The
results of both our across and within subjects analysis can be explained by a model
of two types: selsh subjects who react to deterrent incentives as predicted by the
deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects who take more when incentives are
introduced or raised until incentives reach a very high level. Possible explanations for
the behavior of the second type of subjects are crowding out of fairness concerns by
extrinsic incentives or fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. Only lasting
crowding out of fairness concerns can explain the sequence e¤ects in our data: many
fair-minded subjects take more in a given treatment if this treatment was preceded
by a treatment with stronger incentives than if it was preceded by a treatment with
weaker incentives. Furthermore, we nd that p and f seem to be interchangeable
instruments in achieving deterrence.
Since we obtain our data from neutrally framed experiments, one may question
our results and their applicability to "real life stealing". In real life crime and
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deterrent incentives often have a strong moral connotation and policy makers may
make use of that. Still, we consciously use a neutral frame because our primary aim
is to test the economic approach to crime. Its core, the deterrence hypothesis, relies
on pure incentive e¤ects that are independent of all other factors that may inuence
crime. In Beckers (1968) model framing might ceteris paribus a¤ect Bs decision,
but not the comparative statics with respect to p and f . Whatever the frame the
taken amount should be monotonically decreasing in p and f . In order to measure
the e¤ect of moral costs evoked by a non-neutral, "moral" framing, we run some
additional framed sessions in which we label Bs decision as "stealing" if x > 0 and
the xed ne f as "penalty" instead of "minus points". In these sessions, we still
observe backring of incentives.
Beckers seminal paper has triggered numerous theoretical extensions as well as
eld studies testing its external validity.1 At large the empirical literature implies
that punishment reduces crime, but variations in detection probability and severity
of punishment explain only a small part of the variation in crime (see Glaeser,
1999). This may be caused by methodological problems that arise when using eld
data. Usually only aggregate data are available which results in simultaneity bias2
and omitted variable problems. Field data often report the behavior of o¤enders
only and not that of the general population. Furthermore, measurement error is
widespread as not all crime is reported. All these problems do not exist in the
laboratory.
There already exist experimental studies focusing on criminal behavior. The
experimental literature on tax evasion explicitly addresses deterrence.3 The tax
evasion setups clearly di¤er from ours though. In many settings subjects do not
inuence other subjectspayo¤s at all, in other settings the collected taxes are used
for public good provision or redistribution of resources among a group of subjects. In
contrast, in our setup a stealing subject directly hurts another subject which seems
to be a crucial feature of many crimes. Moreover, there are settings in which the tax
authority is a player and can strategically interact with the taxpayer. In our setup,
however, the victim is passive and incentives are set exogenously. Laboratory exper-
iments on criminal behavior other than tax evasion are scarce. Falk and Fischbacher
1Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) provide comprehensive overviews on the
economic theory of optimal law enforcement. Eide (2000) and Glaeser (1999) survey empirical
studies of the deterrence hypothesis.
2See Levitt (1997) for a convincing example of how to address the simultaneity problem.
3Torgler (2002) reviews the experimental literature on tax evasion and concludes that evidence
on the e¤ectiveness of deterrent incentives is rather mixed (p.662).
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(2002) explore the inuence of social interaction phenomena on committing a crime.
Bohnet and Cooter (2005), Tyran and Feld (2006), and Galbiati and Vertova (2005)
investigate whether law can act as "expressive law", i.e. prevent crime by activating
norms that prohibit committing a crime. Tyran and Feld (2006) also compare the
e¤ects of exogenously imposed and endogenously chosen incentives. Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2002) and Bohnet and Cooter (2005) do not vary incentives and therefore
can not test for incentive e¤ects. The setups of Galbiati and Vertova (2005) and
Tyran and Feld (2006) vary incentives, however in the context of a public good game
which is much more complex than our setup.
In addition, there is a growing economic literature that investigates the e¤ec-
tiveness of incentives in di¤erent contexts as e.g. labor market relations. Some
laboratory and eld experiments document that (small) incentives backre and thus
challenge the belief in the e¤ectiveness of incentives.4 Frey and Jegen (2001) stress
that introducing incentives has two countervailing e¤ects: besides the standard rel-
ative price e¤ect, incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation. With small in-
centives the relative price e¤ect is small and the latter, counterproductive e¤ect
may dominate. Since the contexts of those studies di¤er, the used setups are usu-
ally richer than ours: the incentives are often determined endogenously, an actions
costs and benets may not be common knowledge, or strategic interaction may cause
strategic uncertainty.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedure, section 3 the behavioral predictions and hypotheses. The across and
within subjects analyses are summarized and discussed in section 4. In section 5 we
check the robustness of our results by presenting results from sessions with a moral
frame. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design and procedure
Consider the simplest possible stealing game with two agents, A and B. Agent
A is initially endowed with wA, and agent B is initially endowed with wB, where
4Bowles (2007), Fehr and Falk (2002), and Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the economic literature
on crowding out of intrinsic motivation. The origins of this literature are in psychology, see for
example Deci (1971) and Lepper et al. (1973). Deci et al. (1999) provide a meta-analysis of more
than 100 psychological studies on the e¤ect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.
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wA > wB.5 While agent A is passive, agent B can take any amount x 2 [0; wA] from
agent As endowment. If B does not take anything, i.e. x = 0, agents A and B
both receive their initial endowments wA and wB, respectively. If B takes a strictly
positive amount, i.e. x > 0, with probability (1  p) 2 [0; 1] the taken amount x is
indeed transferred from A to B; with probability p, however, the taken amount x
is not transferred and, on top of that, agent B has to pay a xed ne f . We use a
xed ne f that is independent of x > 0 in order to keep the design as simple and
clear as possible. The structure of the game is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Structure of the game
Since we focus on pure incentive e¤ects on Bs behavior, we vary the detection
probability p and the ne f across di¤erent treatments and x wA and wB at levels
90 and 50, respectively. Table 1 presents the treatments.
Treatment T1, our benchmark treatment, implements no deterrent incentives.
It is simply the mirror image of a dictator game.6 In all other treatments a strictly
positive p and a strictly positive f is implemented. We categorize the intensity of
these incentives according to agent Bs expected payo¤when taking agent As whole
initial endowment. As one can see in Table 1, the level of incentives is (weakly) grad-
ually increasing in the order of the treatment. In treatments T2, T3 and T4 taking
everything pays o¤ in expectation. Treatment T5 is characterized by a combination
of p and f such that taking the maximally possible amount generates about the same
expected payo¤ as taking nothing. In treatment T6, however, the expected payo¤
5wA > wB allows to distinguish between subjects who have a preference for fair (equal) outcomes
and subjects who simply do not want to take anything in treatment T1.
6Here, subjects can decide how much to take away from (instead of to give to) another agent
in a purely distributional context without any strategic considerations.
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Table 1: Treatments
Treatment p f Bs expected payo¤ Bs expected payo¤ Level of incentives
given x = 0 given x = 90
T1 0.0 0 50 140 zero
T2 0.6 6 50 82.4 small
T3 0.5 25 50 82.5 small
T4 0.6 20 50 74 intermediate
T5 0.7 40 50 49 high
T6 0.8 40 50 36 very high
from taking everything is substantially smaller than the one of taking nothing. Since
the same intensity of incentives is implemented by di¤erent p and f in treatments
T2 and T3, we can analyze whether p and f are interchangeable instruments in
deterring taking behavior, at least for this level of incentives.
Each experimental session consisted of three parts: two di¤erent treatments of
the stealing game and a dictator game.7 After these three parts, participants lled
out a questionnaire eliciting data on their age, sex and subject of studies. We
used a paid Holt and Laury (2002) procedure to get an indication of subjectsrisk
preferences.8 The conducted sessions are presented in Table 2.
At the beginning of each session, participants were told that one randomly picked
part out of the three would be paid for all of them. After each part, only the
instructions for the following part were handed out. Subjects did not receive any
feedback before the end of the experiment. They were matched according to a
perfect stranger design, i.e. a couple matched once is never matched again in the
following parts. Those subjects randomly chosen to be agents B in part 1 remained
agents B in part 2 and were assigned the role of the dictator in part 3. Consequently,
passive subjects remained passive throughout all three parts of the session.9
This design o¤ers the possibility to analyze the observed behavior in two di¤erent
ways. First, we can compare behavior in part 1 across di¤erent treatments. This
7In the standard dictator game, the dictator could give any amount of his initial endowment
of 90 to a passive agent with an initial endowment of 50. The chosen amount may indicate the
dictators aversion to advantageous inequity. However, the donated amount might be a¤ected by
the treatments played in part 1 and part 2.
8The translated table and a brief report on the observed levels of risk aversion can be found in
the appendix.
9To keep the passive subjects busy we asked them how they would decide if they were agent B.
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Table 2: Session plan
Session Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Questionnaire* Number of
participants
T1T3 T1 T3 DG Yes 38
T3T1 T3 T1 DG Yes 38
T2T3 T2 T3 DG Yes 18
T3T2 T3 T2 DG Yes 20
T2T4 T2 T4 DG Yes 38
T4T2 T4 T2 DG Yes 36
T5T6 T5 T6 DG Yes 32
T6T5 T6 T5 DG Yes 38
* includes a Holt and Laury (2002) table
is the cleanest comparison because individual behavior in part 1 is not inuenced
by any preplay. Second, we can analyze how agents B adapt their behavior to the
change in incentives from part 1 to part 2. Since the structure of the game is very
simple, we assume that a change in behavior from part 1 to part 2 is stimulated by
the change of incentives rather than learning.
Our experimental sessions were run in November 2006 and March 2007 at the
experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim, Germany. 258 students of the
Universities of Mannheim and Heidelberg participated in the experiment. Subjects
were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part only once. The sessions were
framed neutrally10 and lasted about 40 minutes. Subjects did not receive a show-up
fee11 and earned 12.34 e on average.
3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
We focus on the question how the intensity of incentives a¤ects Bs decision. This
depends on the specic form of Bs utility function. Di¤erent theoretical approaches
make di¤erent assumptions concerning this point and, therefore, have varying be-
havioral predictions.
10Translated instructions for players B can be found in the appendix.
11Six subjects did not earn anything in the randomly selected part and in the Holt and Laury
(2002) table.
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3.1 Behavioral predictions
Model 1: The self-interest model
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all people are selsh, i.e. their
utility function U depends on their own material payo¤m only and is increasing in
m.
With these assumptions the deterrence hypothesis holds, namely the optimal
taken amount x(p; f) is monotonically (weakly) decreasing in p and in f .
Due to the xed ne f agent B who maximizes his expected utility either takes
as much as possible (wA) or nothing. This depends on the relative sizes of p, f , wA,
wB and on the level of risk aversion. Bs optimal taken amount is
x(p; f) 2
8>><>>:
f0g if p > U(wA+wB) U(wB)
U(wA+wB) U(wB f)
f0; wAg if p = U(wA+wB) U(wB)U(wA+wB) U(wB f)
fwAg if p < U(wA+wB) U(wB)U(wA+wB) U(wB f)
.
The higher p and/or the higher f , the less attractive it is to take everything.
For su¢ ciently high values of p and f , agent B does not take anything. This holds
for any risk preferences, i.e. it is independent whether U is concave or convex in m.
A higher level of risk aversion12 reduces U(wA+wB) U(wB)
U(wA+wB) U(wB f) ceteris paribus, and thus
the set of p, f , wA, wB combinations for which taking everything is optimal.
Empirical studies have shown that individual behavior may systematically de-
viate from predictions of the standard neoclassical approach. In these contexts,
however, observed behavior may be consistent with predictions of models of other-
regarding preferences.13 Our two-agent setup with unequal initial endowments is one
of the contexts in which it is very plausible to consider models of fairness concerns.
Model 2: A model of fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt,
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that an agents utility function eU is
increasing in the agents own material payo¤ m, but decreasing in the material
payo¤ inequality jm  yj with y as the material payo¤ of the other agent.
The deterrence hypothesis still holds for a very general class of these models,
i.e. if there exists a unique optimal decision x(p = 0; f = 0) maximizing agent Bs
expected utility for p = 0 and f = 0.
12Consider the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion  mU 00(m)U 0(m) , for example.
13Fehr and Schmidt (2006) survey empirical foundations of other-regarding preferences.
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Due to the xed ne f agent B who maximizes his expected utility either takes
an amount which is optimal for no incentives (x(p = 0; f = 0)) or nothing. For
relatively low values of p and f , agent B takes x(p = 0; f = 0) that may be smaller
than wA. For relatively strong incentives, agent B is deterred and takes nothing.
The reason is that agents cannot trade o¤ payo¤s from di¤erent states, in our
context payo¤s if Bs taking is detected and payo¤s if Bs taking is not detected.
Then, x(p  0; f  0) cannot be strictly larger than x(p = 0; f = 0): if Bs taking
is not detected, eU is maximized at x(p = 0; f = 0); if Bs taking is detected, utilityeU is the same for any x > 0 and larger for x = 0. Analogously, taking any strictly
positive, but strictly smaller amount than x(p = 0; f = 0) yields less expected
utility than taking x(p = 0; f = 0) and, therefore, cannot be optimal.
Model 3: A model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes (e.g. Trautmann 2007)
assume that an agents utility function bU is increasing in the agents own material
payo¤m and decreasing in the absolute di¤erence between own expected payo¤me
and the other agents expected payo¤ ye (jme   yej).14
If jme   yej directly enters the utility function, the deterrence hypothesis may
not hold any more, i.e. there may exist a value of p and f for which x(p; f) is
strictly increasing in p and/or in f .
The reason is that agents can trade o¤ payo¤s from di¤erent states, e.g. an
advantageous inequity in material payo¤s if Bs taking is not detected can compen-
sate a disadvantageous inequity in material payo¤s if Bs taking is detected. As
an illustration consider the following utility function bU = m   maxfme   ye; 0g
with me = (1  p)  (wB + x) + p  (wB   f) and ye = (1  p)  (wA   x) + p  wA.
If  > 1
2
, agent B who maximizes his expected utility tries to perfectly equate me
and ye by choosing x. Hence, agent B takes more, the higher p and/or the higher
f . Nevertheless, deterrence by strong incentives may still occur in this illustration
as x is bounded above by wA.15
Model 4: A model of fairness concerns (regarding nal outcomes) that
are crowded out by incentives
The literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives
uses the term "intrinsic motivation" very broadly. It may apply to fairness concerns
14Therefore, the evaluation of a state may not be independent from another state.
15Consider bU and assume that p and f are so high that taking everything would yield me < ye
with me < wB . In this case taking nothing is optimal.
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as well. In our context, crowding out implies that agents fairness concerns are
diminishing in the intensity of deterrent incentives. Formally, this assumption can
be captured by the following utility function:
V =  (p; f)  U(m) + [1   (p; f)]  eU(m; jm  yj),
where as above U(m) represents utility of a selsh agent and eU(m; jm   yj)
utility of an agent with fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes. The core of the
crowding out assumption is that  (p; f) 2 [0; 1], the weight of U(m), is increasing
in p and in f .
With these assumptions, there may be ranges of p, f combinations such that the
optimal amount x(p; f) strictly increases in p and/or in f . Therefore, the deterrence
hypothesis does not necessarily hold.
The intuition is that if p and f are relatively low, agent B may be strongly
a¤ected by fairness concerns and take an interior amount of his choice set; if p
and f increase, agent B may be less a¤ected by fairness concerns and may take a
substantially higher amount. If the level of incentives is very high, though, such that
both selsh and fair-minded subjects are deterred agent B does not take anything.
Furthermore, the literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic
incentives has drawn attention to the following two aspects on which the verdict is
still out.
(i) Continuity of crowding out
 (p; f) 2 [0; 1] may increase continuously in p and in f . Even if this is the case
x(p; f) may increase discontinuously in p and in f for some eU(m; jm  yj).
The empirical results of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) and Gneezy (2003) sug-
gest discontinuous crowding out. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), however, explain
their data by assuming continuous crowding out.
In our context, subjects who increase their taken amount x to a level strictly less
than the maximal amount of wA as a reaction to an introduction or an increase in
incentives are evidence for continuous rather than discontinuous crowding out.
(ii) Hysteresis
Extrinsic incentives may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly. As a consequence
the crowding out e¤ect of an increase in incentives is larger than the crowding in
e¤ect of the subsequent decrease in incentives that reverses the increase in incentives
by size.
Some studies (e.g. Irlenbusch and Sliwka, 2005, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000,
Gächter, Königstein, and Kessler, 2005) nd evidence for hysteresis, i.e. evidence
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that incentives crowd out fairness concerns lastingly.
In our context, if subjects take "fairer" amounts in a given treatment played in
part 1 than subjects in the same treatment played in part 2 after a part 1 with
relatively stronger incentives, this is evidence for hysteresis. Note that backring
of incentives and hysteresis can only be explained by a model of lasting crowding
out of fairness concerns and not by a model of fairness concerns regarding expected
outcomes. Thus, hysteresis might be a mean to distinguish between these two models
(models 3 and 4) that can explain backring of incentives.
3.2 Hypotheses
The predictions of the various models di¤er. However, all four models predict hy-
pothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Relatively high values of the detection probability p and the xed ne f deter
agents from taking. This range is larger, the more risk averse an agent is.
The threshold of strong incentives may vary by subject. A risk neutral or risk
averse selsh agent abstains from taking in treatments T5 and T6. A risk neutral or
risk averse agent with standard Fehr-Schmidt (1999) fairness preferences may even
abstain from taking in treatment T4. A subject with fairness concerns regarding
expected outcomes may only abstain from taking if p = 1 and f > 0.
In contrast to hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 is necessarily implied by the self-interest
model and the model of fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes, but not by the
model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes and the model of fairness
concerns that are crowded out by incentives.
Hypothesis 2: Deterrence hypothesis
The taken amount x is monotonically (weakly) decreasing in the detection prob-
ability p and the xed ne f .
Hypothesis 2 implies that the average taken amount x should be (weakly) de-
creasing from treatments T1 to T6.
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4 Results
In a rst step we compare behavior in part 1 across subjects. This step has the
advantage that behavior is not inuenced by any preplay. However, we cannot draw
any conclusion whether the observed phenomena are valid on an individual basis,
and whether hysteresis occurs. In a second step we address these issues by comparing
behavior in part 1 with behavior in part 2.
4.1 Comparison of treatments in part 1
4.1.1 Summary statistics
Benchmark treatment
The experimental data in treatment T1 show how much people take in the ab-
sence of deterrent incentives. The upper left panel of Figure 2 summarizes the
distribution of the taken amount x in the benchmark treatment.
As treatment T1 is the mirror image of a dictator game, we can compare behavior
in T1 with standard results of dictator games as for example Forsythe et al. (1994).
In line with their paper, we can identify two types of agents: selsh agents and fair-
minded agents. In their benchmark treatment (the paid dictator game conducted
in April with a pie of 5 $) about 45 % of subjects are "pure gamesmen" who do not
give anything, and the rest gives a strictly positive amount. These types of agents
correspond remarkably well to the 47 % (52.5 %) of selsh subjects in treatment T1
who take everything (between 80 and 90), and the rest who takes a strictly positive
amount below 90 (80).
To summarize, we have two types of agents: slightly less than 50 % of our
subjects have selsh preferences while a bit more than 50 % have fairness concerns.
As the model of fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes shows fairness concerns
are not necessarily a reason why the deterrence hypothesis might fail. But it may
fail if fairness concerns are based on expected outcomes or if they are crowded out
by deterrent incentives. To gure out whether this is the case we have a closer look
at the treatments with deterrent incentives.
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Figure 2: Distributions of x per treatment (in intervals of size 5)16
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Treatments with deterrent incentives
Figure 3 summarizes the average taken amount x per treatment. Treatments are
ordered by the intensity of deterrent incentives, i.e. the combined e¤ect of detection
probability p and ne f (compare Table 1). The average taken amount x increases
in the range of no, small, and intermediate incentives (from T1 to T4), while it
decreases in the range of strong and very strong incentives (T5 and T6). Hence,
the relationship between the average taken amount and the intensity of deterrent
incentives is rather inverted-U shaped than monotonically decreasing.
16Interval y < 90 denoted on the horizontal axis is the union of all points x 2 [y; y+5). Interval
y = 90, in contrast, is the union of all points x = 90.
14
Figure 3: Average taken amount x per treatment
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Figure 2 shows that the fraction of subjects taking everything increases by treat-
ment from T1 to T4. In treatment T4, it peaks at a value of more than 80 % which
is considerably higher than the corresponding 47 % in the absence of any incentives
as in treatment T1. From treatment T5 onwards, this fraction decreases.
Still, the share of subjects not taking anything monotonically increases in the
level of incentives. It is moderate with no, small and intermediate incentives (
10 %), quite substantial with strong incentives (about 25 %), and largest with very
strong incentives (nearly 70 %).
Interestingly, there are always subjects taking interior values of their strategy
set, most so in the benchmark treatment. The share of these subjects decreases
in the intensity of incentives. Moreover, the average taken amount conditional on
interior values increases by treatment from T1 to T4.
Compared to the benchmark treatment deterrent incentives shift mass to the bor-
ders of the support. We observe both backring of small incentives and deterrence
at the same time.17 Small and intermediate incentives move mass predominately
towards the upper border which stands in sharp contrast to the deterrence hypoth-
esis, but is consistent with models 3 and 4. Strong and very strong incentives move
mass exactly to the lower border which is consistent with hypothesis 1.
Since the results of treatments T2 and T3 are very similar, detection probability
and ne seem to be interchangeable instruments.
17In an experiment on corruption that uses probabilistic incentives as we do, Schulze and Frank
(2003) observe a similar pattern in their data.
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4.1.2 Analysis of hypotheses
A Kruskal-Wallis test on behavior in part 1 documents signicant (p < 0.01) treat-
ment e¤ects. In order to identify and characterize the signicant di¤erences we run
pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests. The one-sided p-values are recorded in Table 3.
Table 3: One-sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests
T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
T1 0.287 0.234 0.015 0.400 < 0.001
T2 0.408 0.040 0.447 < 0.001
T3 0.058 0.390 < 0.001
T4 0.071 < 0.001
T5 0.005
In treatment T6, agents take signicantly (p < 0.01) less than in any other
treatment. This is consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. However, contradictory to
hypothesis 2, the deterrence hypothesis, agents take signicantly more in treatment
T4 than in treatments T1 (p < 0.05), T2 (p < 0.05) and T3 (p = 0.058).18 There
is no signicant di¤erence in behavior in treatments T2 and T3.
In order to account for individual characteristics when comparing treatments we
estimate two specications whose results are presented in Table 4.
First, we regress the taken amount x on individual characteristics and treatment
dummies using an OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Second, we address
the fact that the taken amount x is truncated and estimate a Tobit specication
with the same regressors.
In both estimations the treatment dummy for T4 is signicantly positive (p <
0.05), the treatment dummy for T6 is signicantly negative (p < 0.05), and the
treatment dummies for T2 and T3 are not signicantly di¤erent from each other.19
Hence, these results are robust. Risk aversion has a signicantly negative e¤ect (p
< 0.05) on the taken amount in both specications (as subjects with a high level of
18One-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and 2-tests based on a grouping of subjects according
to whether they are deterred, try to roughly equate payo¤s (take between 15 and 29 units), show
some fairness concerns (take between 30 and 79 units) or are selsh (take between 80 and 90 units)
largely conrm the results of the Mann-Whitney-U tests presented here. In particular, subjects
always take signicantly more in treatment T4 than in T1.
19The inclusion of interaction e¤ects of the dummy for risk aversion with the treatment dummies
in the OLS estimation with robust standard errors does not change any of these results.
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Table 4: Regression results
Dependent variable: x OLS-r Tobit
Intercept +057.03*** +094.54***
Sex (1 if male, 0 else) +012.14* +028.08
Risk aversion (1 if risk averse, 0 else) - 014.55** - 057.16**
Economist (1 if economist, 0 else) +010.05* +030.48
DG (donated amount in part 3) - 000.12 - 000.48
T2 +010.23 +033.81
T3 +009.04 +027.32
T4 +018.38** +087.65**
T5 - 007.38 - 020.79
T6 - 042.74*** - 132.64***
Number of observations 129 129
(Pseudo) R 0.3049 0.0754
Ti: 1 if treatment = Ti, 0 else
*, **, *** signicant at 10, 5, 1 percent signicance level
-r with robust standard errors
risk aversion are more likely to be deterred).
Given the results of the Mann-Whitney-U tests and the regressions we do not
reject hypotheses 1, but we reject hypothesis 2, the deterrence hypothesis.
Result 1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Very strong incentives as in treatment T6 signicantly reduce the taken amount.
On average, risk averse agents take signicantly less.
Result 2: Backring of small incentives
Deterrent incentives do not monotonically (weakly) decrease the average taken
amount. Intermediate incentives in treatment T4 signicantly increase the average
taken amount.
Result 3: Interchangeability of detection probability and ne
We do not nd any signicant di¤erences between treatments T2 and T3. In
that sense, detection probability p and ne f seem to be interchangeable policy
instruments.
In sum, these results are consistent with the predictions of the models 3 and 4.
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4.2 Comparison of behavior in part 1 with behavior in part
2
Up to now we have compared di¤erent treatments across di¤erent subjects in part 1.
In contrast to the deterrence hypothesis our results so far show that small and inter-
mediate incentives backre. Crowding out of fairness concerns or a model of fairness
concerns regarding expected outcomes are explanations for this phenomenon. Since
each subject sequentially participated in two di¤erent treatments, we can further
analyze how the same individuals react to a change of deterrent incentives.20 Ses-
sions in which we increase incentives allow us to analyze (i) whether backring of
small and intermediate incentives is observed on an individual level and (ii) whether
backring is a continuous or discontinuous process. Sessions in which we decrease
incentives enable us to check whether we observe hysteresis. Hysteresis can be ex-
plained by lasting crowding out of fairness concerns, but is inconsistent with the
model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. Sessions with incentives
of the same intensity in both parts indicate whether p and f are interchangeable
instruments on an individual level.
4.2.1 Backring of incentives on an individual level
In three di¤erent sessions, we increase incentives from part 1 to part 2: in session
T1T3 from no to small incentives, in session T2T4 from small to intermediate incen-
tives, in session T5T6 from strong to very strong incentives. Figure 4 summarizes
how subjects behave in part 2 conditional on whether they acted selshly (x = 90),
acted fair-mindedly (0 < x < 90) or were deterred (x = 0) in part 1.
Since the benchmark treatment was played in the rst part of session T1T3, we
can identify about 47 % of subjects with selsh preferences. All except one take
everything in part 2 again. 53 % of all subjects take an amount strictly less than
everything in part 1. About a third of them increase the taken amount x to a level
smaller than 90, a fth switches to taking everything in part 2, and another fth
keeps x constant. Hence, for 50 % of fair-minded subjects small incentives seem to
strictly backre. Only one selsh and one fair-minded subject are deterred by small
incentives.
20Since subjects do not get any feedback after part 1, behavioral e¤ects cannot be triggered by
the realization of punishment.
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Figure 4: Reactions to an increase in the intensity of incentives
Reactions in T1T3 (N = 19)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
x = 90   increase in x
| x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in x
| x > 0
x = 0
Behavior in part 2
R
el
at
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
selfish in part 1 (47.37%)
fair-minded in part 1 (52.63%)
deterred in part 1 (0%)
Reactions in T2T4 (N = 19)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in
x | x > 0
x = 0
Behavior in part 2
R
el
at
iv
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
"selfish" in part 1 (63.16%)
fair-minded in part 1 (26.31%)
deterred in part 1 (10.53%)
Reactions in T5T6 (N = 16)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
x = 90   increase in
x | x < 90
   constant
x | 0 < x < 90
decrease in x
| x > 0
x = 0
Behavior in part 2
R
el
at
iv
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
"selfish" in part 1 (62.5%)
fair-minded in part 1 (12.5%)
deterred in part 1 (25%)
In session T2T4, about 63 % of subjects take everything already in part 1.
We cannot distinguish whether they have selsh preferences or whether they have
fairness concerns which are completely crowded out by the small incentives present
in part 1. Again, the majority of these subjects is not deterred and keeps taking
everything in part 2. The share of subjects taking intermediate amounts in part 1 is
considerably smaller than in session T1T3. For 20 % of these subjects the increase
of incentives completely backres. The majority, however, is deterred. Note that a
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moderate fraction of deterrence can already be found in part 1.21
In session T5T6, 62.5 % of subjects still take everything in part 1. More than
two thirds of them are deterred by the increase of incentives though. 25 % of all
subjects are deterred in part 1 and stay deterred in part 2. Only 12.5 % of subjects
take a strictly positive amount below 90 in part 1. Half of them are deterred in the
second part.
These observations can be summarized in the following two results:
Result 4: Backring of small incentives on an individual level
Subjects seem to be heterogeneous. There are selsh agents for which the de-
terrence hypothesis holds. However, there are also fair-minded agents for which
small and intermediate incentives backre. Independent of the type of agent, strong
incentives deter.
Result 5: Continuous and discontinuous backring of incentives
We nd evidence for both continuous and discontinuous backring of incentives.
4.2.2 Hysteresis
Whether hysteresis (lasting crowding out of fairness concerns) is present in our
data can be seen by comparing behavior of a given treatment played in part 1
with behavior of the same treatment played in part 2 after a part 1 with stronger
incentives. Hysteresis implies that we observe sequence e¤ects for these treatments.
Table 5 records two-sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests that compare
the same treatment played in di¤erent parts of a session.22
As Table 5 indicates we observe sequence e¤ects in treatments T1, T2, and T5.
Subjects in T1 take signicantly (p < 0.05) more when it is played after T3 (81.3
instead of 65.0 units on average). Preplay in T3 with small incentives increases
the average taken amount in treatment T1 that does not implement any incentives.
Similarly, the average taken amount in T2 is signicantly (p < 0.05) higher when it is
played second (after a harsher or a constant intensity of incentives) than rst. Both
21In sessions T1T3 and T2T4, none of the proposed models can explain the behavior of subjects
who react to increased incentives by decreasing the taken amount to a level strictly larger than 0
or increasing it from 0 to a strictly positive amount.
22Treatments T2 and T3 are played second in two di¤erent sessions. Since the observations
from the di¤erent second parts are not signicantly di¤erent (p=0.71 and p=0.34, respectively
according to two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests) for di¤erent sessions, we do not report each session
comparison separately.
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Table 5: Non-parametric comparisons of di¤erent sequences (Mann-Whitney-U test)
Treatment played played p-value
rst in second in (two sided)
T1 T1T3 T3T1 0.082
T2 T2T3 T3T2 0.099
T2T4 T4T2
T3 T3T1 T1T3 0.676
T3T2 T2T3
T4 T4T2 T2T4 0.061
T5 T5T6 T6T5 0.014
T6 T6T5 T5T6 0.617
results are consistent with a model of lasting crowding out of fairness concerns, but
cannot be reconciled with the predictions of a model of fairness concerns regarding
expected outcomes. In contrast, in T5 with strong deterrent incentives subjects
take signicantly (p < 0.05) less when it is played after T6. Preplay in T6 with very
strong incentives seems to increase deterrence in treatment T5. This is inconsistent
with a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes and is inconsistent
with lasting crowding out of fairness concerns if fairness concerns imply less taking
in treatment T5 than selsh concerns imply.
Result 6: Hysteresis
Small and intermediate incentives have a lasting e¤ect. They still backre when
incentives are decreased or even removed in the following period.
Since we observe hysteresis, a model of fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes
that is crowded out by incentives explains our data better than a model of fairness
concerns regarding expected outcomes. Hysteresis also underlines how costly extrin-
sic incentives are. In addition to the e¤ect incentives have in the current period they
may also inuence behavior in future periods. From this perspective, also strong and
very strong incentives could potentially backre by crowding out fairness concerns
in future periods in which incentives are smaller.
In treatments with an increase in incentives there are no signicant sequence
e¤ects for treatments T3 and T6, but subjects in treatment T4 take signicantly (p
< 0.05) less when it is played in part 2 after treatment T2 than when treatment T4
is played in part 1.
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4.2.3 Substitutability of detection probability and ne
Since treatments T2 and T3 have the same intensity of deterrent incentives imple-
mented by di¤erent values of the detection probability p and ne f , we can test
- at least for this specic level of incentives - whether these two instruments are
interchangeable. We have already observed that the treatments T2 and T3 do not
di¤er signicantly across subjects in part 1 (result 3). Our within subject analysis
in Figure 5 conrms this result.
Figure 5: Reactions to a change in incentives keeping their intensity constant
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In session T2T3, 7 out of 10 subjects do not change their behavior. In session
T3T2, only a single subject is apart from the 45 line. 6 subjects keep taking
everything, 2 keep taking the same intermediate amount.
Result 7: Interchangeability of detection probability and ne on an
individual level
Our within subjects comparison conrm result 3 that p and f seem to be inter-
changeable instruments.
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5 Robustness check - Framing
So far we have presented results from neutrally framed experiments. This is a valid
approach to test the deterrence hypothesis that relies on pure incentive e¤ects that
are independent of all other factors that may inuence crime as e.g. the frame.
While a non-neutral frame may ceteris paribus a¤ect the taken amount (e.g. due
to additional moral costs), comparative statics should remain unchanged. For any
given (neutral or non-neutral) frame the deterrence hypothesis predicts the taken
amount to be monotonically decreasing in detection probability and ne. In contrast,
it is not clear whether a non-neutral frame interacts with incentives in the model of
fairness concerns regarding nal outcomes that are crowded out by incentives which
ts our data best. While neutrally framed incentives crowd out fairness concerns,
this may not necessarily be the case for incentives that are combined with a strong
moral connotation.
In real life deterrent incentives often have a moral connotation and policy makers
may try to make use of that. This is why we run two additional morally framed
sessions and have a look at whether a non-neutral, moral frame will change our
results. In the morally framed sessions Bs decision was labeled as "stealing" if x > 0
and the xed ne f was called "penalty" instead of "minus points". Apart from
these two di¤erent labels the neutrally and morally framed sessions were conducted
completely identically. In order to check whether framing a¤ects behavior in the
absence of incentives we run a framed version of treatment T1 (T1f). To analyze
whether framing and incentives interact we run a framed version of treatment T4
(T4f).23 38 subjects participated in session T1fT4f, 32 subjects in session T4fT1f.
The results in the framed and neutral treatments are similar. There is no signif-
icant framing e¤ect in part 1 in the absence of incentives, i.e. between T1 and T1f
(two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test: p > 0.5). In contrast, subjects take more in part
1 in treatment T4 than in treatment T4f (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test: p =
0.075). There is no signicant di¤erence in parts 1 between treatments T1f and T4f.
However, the within subjects analysis documents a substantial degree of crowding
out: when incentives are introduced in part 2 of session T1fT4f more than 30 % of
individuals ip from taking intermediate amounts to taking everything. This paral-
lels the results obtained in the neutrally framed sessions T1T3 and T2T4. In sum,
23We choose treatment T4 since the intensity of deterrent incentives in this treatment is (i) low
enough not to deter the majority of individuals and (ii) high enough to potentially crowd out
fairness concerns signicantly.
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we conclude that also with moral framing backring of intermediate incentives is a
non-negligible phenomenon.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis applied to the
context of stealing. Our across subjects analysis of part 1 reject the hypothesis that
the average taken amount is monotonically decreasing in deterrent incentives. On
average, subjects take most when intermediate incentives are present. Only very
strong incentives deter.
Both our across subjects comparison of behavior in part 1 and our within subjects
comparison of behavior in part 1 with behavior in part 2 reect two di¤erent types
of subjects. We identify 50 % selsh subjects whose behavior is consistent with
the deterrence hypothesis and 50 % fair-minded subjects for which intermediate
incentives backre. Since we observe hysteresis, a model of lasting crowding out of
fairness concerns explains our data best.
We have contributed to the empirical literature on crowding out in various ways.
First, we observe crowding out of fairness concerns in a very simple setting which
does not leave a lot of scope for the triggers of crowding out that are usually stressed
in this literature. Second, we have established the existence of crowding out as a
reaction to probabilistic incentives24 and in a new domain, namely when incentives
are set to deter criminal activities. Third, our comparison of behavior in part 1
with behavior in part 2 provides further evidence for lasting crowding out as it
is observed by Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), and
Gächter, Königstein and Kessler (2005). While it exists for many subjects, we
have also observed some subjects whose fairness concerns are - at least partially -
reestablished when incentives are reduced or removed completely. The circumstances
under which crowding out is lasting remain a topic for future research. Fourth, our
study has explicitly focused on the domain of small incentives that are especially
important in real life25: we have run four out of six treatments with small incentives
24To our knowledge the only other paper that documents the existence of crowding out of intrinsic
motivation due to probabilistic incentives is Schulze and Frank (2003).
25In Germany, the clearance rate for thefts with (without) aggravating circumstances was 14 %
(44 %) in 2005 (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 2005, Table 23). Andreoni et al. (1998) present
gures for tax evasion in the US: in 1995, the audit rate for individual tax return was only 1.7 %,
the penalty for underpayment of taxes usually 20 % of the underpayment. Polinsky and Shavell
(2000b) point out that in general the severity of punishment is quite low in relation what potential
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that according to standard neoclassical theory should not deter risk neutral subjects.
Thus, we have several treatments to analyze whether crowding out is a continuous
or discontinuous process. Our within subject analysis nds evidence for both.
Interestingly, incentives - even in this very simple and plain context - backre.
Kahneman and Tverskys (1986) argument that extrinsic incentives shift the context
from an ethical and other-regarding to an instrumental and self-regarding one seems
to be adequate for our results. Similarly, the ndings conrm those of Houser et al.
(2007) who show that crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not only caused by the
intentions that incentives signal, but also by incentives per se.
What are the policy implications from our experimental study? Taking our data
literally would imply to punish criminal behavior either hard or not at all in order
to avoid backring of small incentives. Of course, the laboratory may abstract from
social norms and stigmata that could be "the" driving forces behind punishment
in reducing criminal behavior. Thus, we do not conclude that punishment does
not work outside the laboratory. However, our data directly reject the deterrence
hypothesis that relies on punishment whose e¤ectiveness is caused by pure incentive
e¤ects that are independent of all other factors that may inuence crime. Our
results show that if crime were a gamble - as economists generally argue and as we
have modeled it in the laboratory - pure incentives may not work: Especially small
and intermediate incentives backre and may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly.
Thus, to convincingly contribute to the discussion on how to e¢ ciently deter crime
economists should go beyond the standard deterrence hypothesis.
7 Appendix
7.1 Experimental sessions and instructions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects
were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took
their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The random allo-
cation to a cubicle also determined a subjects role in all three parts. Subjects were
handed out the general instructions for the experiment as well as the instructions
for part 1. After all subjects had read both instructions carefully and all remaining
questions were answered we proceeded to the decision stage of the rst part. Part 2
and 3 were conducted in an analogous way. We nished each experimental session by
o¤enders are capable to pay.
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letting subjects answer a questionnaire that asked for demographic characteristics
and included a paid Holt and Laury (2002) table. This table was explained in detail
in the questionnaire and it was highlighted that one randomly drawn decision from
the table was paid out in addition to the earnings in the previous parts.
Instructions, the program, and the questionnaire were originally written in Ger-
man. The translated general instructions, the translated instructions of the neutrally
framed treatment T4 in part 1 for agent B, and the translated Holt and Laury (2002)
table can be found in the following. Instructions for part 2 and part 3 are as similar
to part 1 as possible. For the framed treatments, we used the expression "steal any
integer amount between 0 and 90 from participant A" instead of "choose any integer
amount between 0 and 90 that shall be transferred from participant A to you", and
the term "minus a penalty of x points" instead of "minus an amount of x points".
7.1.1 Translated general instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants will
determine the result of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will
be paid in cash according to the actual result. So please read the instructions
thoroughly and think about your decision carefully.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants, to use
cell phones or to start any other programs on the computer. The neglect of these
rules will lead to the immediate exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to
your seat to answer your questions.
During the experiment we will talk about points instead of Euros. Your total income
will therefore be calculated in points rst. At the end of the experiment the total
amount of points will be converted into Euros according to the following exchange
rate:
1 point = 15 Cents.
The experiment consists of three independent parts in which you can accumulate
points. Before each part only the instructions of this part will be handed out.
During the experiment neither you nor the other participants will receive
any information on the course of the experiment (e.g. decisions of other
participants or results of a particular part).
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The results of each single part will be calculated only after all three parts will be
nished. Then, one of these three parts will be chosen randomly. At
the end of the whole experiment only this part will be paid out in cash
according to your decisions.
7.1.2 Translated instructions of the neutrally framed treatment T4 in
part 1
Part 1
In this part there are participants in role A and participants in role B. You
have been randomly assigned role B for this part. You will be randomly
and anonymously matched to another participant in role A. This random
matching lasts only for this part. The matched participant will not be matched to
you in the following two parts again. Neither before nor after the experiment will you
receive any information about the identity of your matched participant. Likewise,
your matched participant will not receive any information about your identity.
As participant B you have an initial endowment of 50 points. Participant A has an
initial endowment of 90 points.
As a participant in role B you can choose any integer amount between 0 and 90
points (including 0 and 90) which shall be transferred from participant A to
you. Participant A does not make any decision. In order to make your decision
please enter your chosen amount on the corresponding computer screen and push
the OK button.
 If you choose a transfer amount of 0 points, you will receive your initial en-
dowment of 50 points, and participant A will receive his initial endowment of
90 points.
 If you choose a transfer amount larger than 0 points,
with 40 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points plus your chosen transfer amount and participant
A will receive his initial endowment of 90 points minus your
chosen transfer amount.
with 60 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points minus an amount of 20 points, i.e. 30 points, and
participant A will receive his initial endowment of 90 points.
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Example 1 : You choose a transfer amount of 22 points. With 40 % probability
you will receive 50 + 22 points = 72 points, and with 60 % probability you will
receive 50  20 points = 30 points. Participant A will receive 90  22 points =
68 points with 40 % probability and his initial endowment of 90 points with 60 %
probability.
Example 2 : You choose a transfer amount of 0 points. You will receive 50 points.
Participant A will receive 90 points.
The course of action of part 1 is illustrated by the following graph:
Your decision
You choose a transfer amount
of 0 points.
You choose a transfer amount
larger than 0 points.
Your points: 50
Participant A’s points: 90
Einkommen von Akteur 2:
10
Punkte
With 40 % probability:
Your points: 50 + chosen transfer amount
Participant A’s points: 90 –chosen transfer amount
With 60 % probability:
Your points: 50-20=30
Participant A’s points: 90
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to
your seat to answer your questions.
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7.1.3 Translated Holt and Laury (2002) table
Decision Option A Option B
Decision 1 10 points 25 points with a probability of 10 %
0 points with a probability of 90 %
Decision 2 10 points 25 points with a probability of 20 %
0 points with a probability of 80 %
Decision 3 10 points 25 points with a probability of 30 %
0 points with a probability of 70 %
Decision 4 10 points 25 points with a probability of 40 %
0 points with a probability of 60 %
Decision 5 10 points 25 points with a probability of 50 %
0 points with a probability of 50 %
Decision 6 10 points 25 points with a probability of 60 %
0 points with a probability of 40 %
Decision 7 10 points 25 points with a probability of 70 %
0 points with a probability of 30 %
Decision 8 10 points 25 points with a probability of 80 %
0 points with a probability of 20 %
Decision 9 10 points 25 points with a probability of 90 %
0 points with a probability of 10 %
Decision 10 10 points 25 points with a probability of 100 %
0 points with a probability of 0 %
Participants made 10 separate decisions whether they preferred option A to
option B. Option B varied by the decisions with the associated probabilities displayed
above. One decision was chosen randomly (all with equal probability) and paid at
the end of the experiment.
We classify the observed 51 subjects who prefer option A to option B in decisions
1 to 4 and option B to option A otherwise as risk-neutral. The observed 16 subjects
preferring option A in decisions 1 to 5 are categorized as risk-seeking. We observe
88 risk-averse subjects indicating option A in decisions 1 to k, with k > 5. Three
subjects behave irrationally (or are humble) in the sense that they prefer option A
to option B in decision 10.
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